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 “I think I’m getting the black lung, Pop.”1 This recognizable quote from the 
movie Zoolander makes light of the disease; indeed, to many of us, black lung is a 
thing of the past.2 But there are areas in the United States where coal mining is still 
an important industry and the men and women who work in coal mines are exposed 
to coal dust that eventually causes black lung.3 Mine workers must be able to receive 
health benefits when the debilitating effects of black lung render them unable to 
work.4 Unfortunately, disabled workers are often met with obstacles in receiving their 
benefits, and they must engage in years of legal battles to collect the full benefits 
they deserve.5
 In 1969, Congress passed the Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act 
(CMHSA).6 The primary goal of the CMHSA, as declared by Congress, was to 
ensure the “health and safety of [the coal mining industry’s] most precious resource—
the miner.”7 The CMHSA defined a “miner” as “any individual working in a coal 
mine.”8 Included within the CMHSA was a subchapter called the Black Lung 
Benefits Act (BLBA), which discussed benefits for miners who suffer from 
debilitating pneumoconiosis, also known as black lung.9 The Black Lung Benefits 
Reform Act of 1977, which amended the BLBA, defined the term “miner” more 
narrowly and explained how a miner can qualify to receive benefits.10
 In order to receive benefits under the BLBA, a miner must prove that he qualifies 
under a four-factor test laid out by the Department of Labor (DOL).11 The test 
requires that a miner prove: “(1) he has pneumoconiosis; (2) his pneumoconiosis arose 
at least in part out of his coal mine employment; (3) he is totally disabled; and (4) the 
total disability is due to pneumoconiosis.”12 There is a presumption of eligibility for 
benefits for miners who were employed for at least fifteen years in an underground 
1. Zoolander (Paramount Pictures 2001).
2. See Katie Valentine, Black Lung Among Coal Miners At Highest Level in 40 Years, Think Progress (Sept. 
16, 2014, 3:51 PM), http://thinkprogress.org/climate/2014/09/16/3568204/black-lung-levels-surge/.
3. Id.
4. Black Lung, United Mine Workers Am., http://www.umwa.org/?q=content/black-lung (last visited 
Apr. 20, 2016) (“Black lung is a legal term describing a preventable, occupational lung disease that is 
contracted by prolonged breathing of coal mine dust. Described by a variety of names, including miner’s 
asthma, silicosis, coal workers’ pneumoconiosis, and black lung, they are all dust diseases with the same 
symptoms.”).
5. See, e.g., Navistar, Inc. v. Forester, 767 F.3d 638 (6th Cir. 2014).
6. Pub. L. No. 91-173, 83 Stat. 742 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 30 U.S.C.).
7. Id. § 2(a).
8. Id. § 3(g).
9. Id. §§ 401–426. See generally Pneumoconiosis, Am. Lung Ass’n, http://www.lung.org/lung-disease/
pneumoconiosis (last visited Apr. 20, 2016).
10. Pub. L. No. 95-239, 92 Stat. 95 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 30 U.S.C.).
11. Black Lung Benefits Act, Pub. L. No. 91-173, §§ 411(b), 422(h), 83 Stat. 742, 793, 797.
12. Navistar, Inc. v. Forester, 767 F.3d 638, 640 (6th Cir. 2014); see also 20 C.F.R. §§ 718.201–718.204 
(2015).
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coal mine and are totally disabled by pneumoconiosis.13 The employer, who would be 
responsible for paying the miner’s benefits, can rebut this presumption by proving 
either that the miner does not have pneumoconiosis or that the miner’s respiratory 
impairment was not a result of his employment in a coal mine.14
 The BLBA defines a “miner” as:
any individual who works or has worked in or around a coal mine or coal 
preparation facility in the extraction or preparation of coal. Such term also 
includes an individual who works or has worked in coal mine construction or 
transportation in or around a coal mine, to the extent such individual was 
exposed to coal dust as a result of such employment.15
The DOL’s Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs (OWCP) was assigned 
responsibility for coal miners’ health by the Secretary of Labor,16 and expanded the 
BLBA’s definition of “miner.”17 The expansion offers “a rebuttable presumption that 
any person working in or around a coal mine or coal preparation facility is a miner.”18 
The DOL offers employers an opportunity to rebut that presumption by showing 
that: “(1) [t]he person was not engaged in the extraction, preparation or transportation 
of coal while working at the mine site, or in maintenance or construction of the mine 
site”; or “(2) [t]he individual was not regularly employed in or around a coal mine or 
coal preparation facility.”19
 The decisions that have applied these acts create a test for determining when a 
worker should be considered a “miner.” The two-part test, called the situs-function 
test, comes from a Sixth Circuit case, Falcon Coal Co. v. Clemons.20 The first part of 
the test, the “situs” portion, requires that an employee work in or around a coal mine 
to be considered a “miner.”21 The second part of the test, the “function” portion, 
requires that an employee be involved in the extraction, transportation, or preparation 
13. 30 U.S.C. § 921(c)(4) (2012).
14. Id.
15. Pub. L. No. 95-239, § 2(b), 92 Stat. 95.
16. Delegation of Authorities and Assignment of Responsibilities to the Director, Office of Workers’ 
Compensation Programs, 74 Fed. Reg. 58,834 (Nov. 13, 2009).
17. Compare 20 C.F.R. § 725.202(a) (“A ‘miner’ for the purposes of this part is any person who works or has 
worked in or around a coal mine or coal preparation facility in the extraction, preparation, or 
transportation of coal, and any person who works or has worked in coal mine construction or 
maintenance in or around a coal mine or coal preparation facility.”), with Black Lung Benefits Act, Pub. 
L. No. 91-173, § 402(d), 83 Stat. 742, 793 (1969) (“The term ‘miner’ means any individual who is or was 
employed in an underground coal mine.”).
18. 20 C.F.R. § 725.202(a).
19. Id.
20. 873 F.2d 916 (6th Cir. 1989) (holding that a night watchman was not a “miner” as defined by the Act, 
because his work was not “integral and necessary” to the operation of the mine and establishing the 
standard for the situs-function test).
21. Id. at 921. 
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of coal, or the construction of coal mines, in order to be eligible to receive benefits.22 
Courts have expanded the “function” portion of the test23 to include workers 
performing incidental duties at a coal mine, provided that said duties are an “integral” 
or “necessary” part of the mining process.24 This category includes workers whose jobs 
involve keeping the mine fully functional.25
 Navistar, Inc. v. Forester, a case decided by the Sixth Circuit in 2014, involved a 
federal mine inspector who was denied the use of the rebuttable presumption after 
the court ruled that he did not qualify as a “miner.”26 This case comment contends 
that the Sixth Circuit erred when it held that Terry Forester was not entitled to the 
fifteen-year presumption of eligibility because his employment did not meet the 
requirements of being a “miner” as defined by the BLBA.27 The court erred in three 
ways. First, the court incorrectly gave more deference to the opinion of the Director 
of the OWCP than the DOL Benefits Review Board (BRB).28 Second, the court’s 
holding that Congress intended to exclude federal mine inspectors from eligibility 
lacked substantiation, as nothing in the statute indicates that they were meant to be 
excluded.29 Third, the court construed its own holding in Sammons v. EAS Coal Co., 
which had granted BLBA benefits to a mine inspector, too narrowly.30 This case 
comment further contends that there are legitimate policy reasons, including but not 
limited to incentivizing employment as a federal mine inspector, to include federal 
mine inspectors in the class of “miner” that is statutorily eligible for the fifteen-year 
presumption.
 Terry Forester, the respondent, worked as a private mine inspector for Wisconsin 
Steel in underground Kentucky coal mines from 1970 to 1975.31 Wisconsin Steel 
later became Navistar, the petitioner in this case.32 Upon leaving Wisconsin Steel’s 
employ in 1975, Forester began working for the DOL’s Mine Safety and Health 
Administration (MSHA) as a federal mine inspector in Kentucky.33 Forester’s 
position as a federal mine inspector required him to visit underground coal mines 
every day to ensure they were complying with federal mine safety regulations.34 
22. Id.
23. See, e.g., id.; Sammons v. EAS Coal Co., No. 92-3030, 1992 WL 348976 (6th Cir. Nov. 24, 1992).
24. Falcon Coal Co., 873 F.2d at 922. 
25. Id.
26. 767 F.3d 638, 640 (6th Cir. 2014).
27. See id.
28. See id. at 644–45.
29. See id. at 646–67.
30. See id. at 645–46.
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Forester worked as a federal mine inspector until 1991, when he sustained a knee 
injury.35 The next year, Forester “was declared totally disabled due to breathing 
problems,” a condition that entitled him to benefits under the Federal Employees’ 
Compensation Act (FECA).36 Then, in 2008, Forester filed a claim to receive 
additional benefits under the BLBA.37
 Upon review, the OWCP denied Forester’s claim, finding that “the evidence 
failed to show that [he] was totally disabled due to pneumoconiosis.”38 Forester 
requested a formal hearing with an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) to challenge the 
OWCP’s finding.39 At the hearing on April 6, 2011, “Navistar stipulated that Forester 
had seventeen years of coal mine employment.”40 After the hearing, Navistar submitted 
a brief stating that its stipulation was contrary to the law.41 Navistar argued that its 
stipulation was not binding based on Fourth Circuit precedent that would exclude 
Forester from qualifying for the fifteen-year presumption.42 The ALJ found that 
Forester’s employment as a federal mine inspector did qualify him as a “miner” by the 
statutory definition and therefore held that Navistar’s stipulation was to be upheld as 
it was not contrary to law.43 The ALJ further found that the new evidence Forester 
submitted regarding his pneumoconiosis was sufficient to prove that he was totally 
disabled, meaning that he met the requirements for the fifteen-year presumption of 
eligibility to receive benefits.44 Due to its stipulation, Navistar failed to rebut the 
presumption, and the ALJ granted Forester benefits under the BLBA, backdated to 
2008 when he originally filed his claim.45
 Navistar then appealed the decision of the ALJ to the BRB, arguing that the ALJ 
“erred in crediting claimant with seventeen years of underground coal mine 
employment.”46 Navistar again argued that Fourth Circuit precedent should preclude 
Forester’s eligibility for the fifteen-year presumption.47 Additionally, Navistar argued 
that because Forester could apply for benefits through FECA, the years he spent as a 
35. Id.
36. Id.; see also Federal Employees’ Compensation Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 8101–8193 (2012).
37. Forester, 767 F.3d at 641.
38. Id. at 641–42.
39. Id. at 642.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id. See generally McGraw v. Office of Workers’ Comp. Program, No. 88-1162, 1990 WL 101412 (4th 
Cir. July 10, 1990); Kopp v. Office of Workers’ Comp. Program, 877 F.2d 307 (4th Cir. 1989).
43. Forester v. Navistar Int. Truck & Engine Corp., BRB No. 12-0442 BLA, 2013 WL 3479965, at *1 




47. Id. at *2.
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federal mine inspector should be excluded from a determination of eligibility.48 The 
BRB stated that it must affirm the ALJ’s decision “if it is rational, supported by 
substantial evidence, and in accordance with applicable law.”49 The board looked to 
the ALJ’s reasoning for the decision, using the situs-function test and its application 
in Duquesne Light Co. v. Moore, and determined that federal mine inspectors were 
included in the BLBA’s definition of “miner,” and therefore were eligible for the 
fifteen-year presumption.50 According to the BRB, the ALJ’s reliance on Moore and 
Sixth Circuit cases rather than Fourth Circuit cases was permissible and Navistar’s 
stipulation was binding as it was not contrary to law.51 The BRB affirmed the ALJ’s 
ruling, awarding BLBA benefits to Forester.52
 Navistar appealed the BRB’s decision, bringing the case to the Court of Appeals 
for the Sixth Circuit.53 The Sixth Circuit began its analysis by discussing how much 
deference should be given to each party’s argument.54 The court decided that the 
BRB should not be given any special deference as it serves as a review board and does 
not create rules or policy.55 Next, the Sixth Circuit discussed how much deference 
should be given to the opinion of the Director of the OWCP when it is within the 
DOL’s power to create policy and rules.56 The Director argued that federal mine 
inspectors should not be considered “miners” under the BLBA definition as they do 
not satisfy the function test.57 The Sixth Circuit noted that there is no federal law 
addressing whether or not federal mine inspectors were meant to be included in the 
BLBA’s definition of “miner.”58
 The court analyzed the Director’s assessment that a federal mine inspector should 
not be included in the statutory definition of a “miner.”59 The Sixth Circuit reasoned 
that a federal mine inspector does not perform maintenance work and that the 
inspector’s duties are purely regulatory.60 The opinion discussed an unpublished 
Sixth Circuit decision that ruled a mine inspector does perform a necessary and 
integral part of a coal mining operation, but distinguished that case because the 
48. Id. at *1.
49. Id. at *2.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id. at *3.
53. Navistar, Inc. v. Forester, 767 F.3d 638, 640 (6th Cir. 2014).
54. Id. at 644.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 642, 644.
58. Id. at 644.
59. Id. at 644–47.
60. Id. at 645.
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inspector was employed by the mining company itself and was not a federal 
inspector.61
 Finally, the Sixth Circuit turned its analysis to congressional intent and determined 
that Congress created federal mine inspector positions within the DOL in order to 
separate inspection from production.62 The court held, based on this interpretation of 
Congress’s intent, that the Director was correct in his assertion that Forester could 
not be considered a “miner” under the BLBA’s definition.63 Since Forester’s position as 
a federal mine inspector did not fall under the definition of being a “miner,” the court 
held that he had not met the fifteen-year employment threshold and was therefore not 
entitled to the fifteen-year presumption for pneumoconiosis, regardless of whether 
Navistar could rebut or had rebutted it.64 The Sixth Circuit vacated Forester’s award 
of BLBA benefits and remanded the case to an ALJ for further review of Forester’s 
eligibility for benefits.65
 This case comment contends that the Sixth Circuit erred in its decision not to 
classify Forester as a “miner.” First, the Sixth Circuit should not have given more 
deference to the OWCP Director’s opinion, as the BRB is a ruling body authorized 
to determine what regulations actually mean and how they should be applied. 
Second, contrary to the Sixth Circuit’s findings, Congress intended that federal 
mine inspectors be included in the definition of “miner.” Third, the Sixth Circuit 
erred in its decision to narrow its holding in Sammons by creating an arbitrary division 
between private mine inspectors and federal mine inspectors. Finally, for the policy 
reasons addressed below, Forester’s years as a federal mine inspector should have 
been viewed as time spent as a “miner” and qualified him for the fifteen-year 
presumption regarding BLBA benefits.
 The Third and Fourth Circuits have split in determining whether a federal mine 
inspector qualifies as a “miner” for purposes of receiving BLBA benefits and for 
eligibility for the fifteen-year presumption.66 Forester was a case of first impression 
for the Sixth Circuit.67
 In Duquesne Light Company v. Moore, the Third Circuit affirmed an agency 
decision from the BRB that included federal mine inspectors in the definition of 
61. Id. at 645–46 (discussing Sammons v. EAS Coal Co., No. 92-3030, 1992 WL 348976 (6th Cir. Nov. 
24, 1992)).
62. Id. at 646.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 647.
65. Id.
66. Compare McGraw v. Office of Workers’ Comp. Program, No. 88-1162, 1990 WL 101412, at *1 (4th 
Cir. July 10, 1990) (“[E]mployment as a federal mine inspector does not meet the statutory definition of 
a miner.”), with Forester, 767 F.3d at 642 (discussing Duquesne Light Co. v. Moore, 681 F.2d 805 (3rd 
Cir. 1982), aff ’g 4 Black Lung Rep. (Juris) 1-40.2 (Ben. Rev. Bd. 1981)).
67. Forester, 767 F.3d at 640; see also Phyllis L. Robinson & Barry Lewis, The Federal Black Lung Program: A 
General Survey of the Sixth Circuit, 1988 Det. C.L. Rev. 643 (1988).
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“miner.”68 The BRB decided, and the court affirmed, that federal mine inspectors are 
“miners” under the situs test because they perform a large part of their work in 
underground coal mines.69 The court further held that federal mine inspectors satisfy 
the function test because their inspections are a necessary and integral part of 
successful mine operation.70 In the court’s reasoning, inspectors should be eligible for 
BLBA benefits because safety inspections by federal mine inspectors are required by 
statute.71
 Similarly, in K.C. v. Navistar, a BRB case from Kentucky, a man who had worked 
as a federal mine inspector and in other capacities sought BLBA benefits for his 
employment as a miner.72 As the case would have fallen under the jurisdiction of the 
Sixth Circuit had it advanced to an appellate court, the BRB discussed the situs and 
function tests laid out by the Sixth Circuit.73 The BRB held that federal mine 
inspectors had been previously shown to meet the requirements of situs and function, 
and could therefore apply for BLBA benefits.74
 In McGraw v. Office of Workers’ Compensation Program, by contrast, the Fourth 
Circuit heard an appeal from an agency case and held that a federal mine inspector 
does not fall within the BLBA’s definition of “miner” and that such employment 
could not be included in the time required for the fifteen-year presumption because 
federal mine inspectors are not involved in the extraction or preparation of coal.75 
The court, based on this reasoning, held that a federal mining inspector does not 
perform coal mining work, and therefore time spent in that position could not be 
used to establish the presumption of pneumoconiosis.76 This case cited Kopp v. Office 
of Workers’ Compensation Programs, another Fourth Circuit case, for authority in its 
decision.77
 In Kopp, plaintiff Kenneth Kopp had worked as a mine laborer and then as a 
mine superintendent before leaving his position to become a federal mine inspector.78 
He filed for benefits under the BLBA and was denied; the case eventually reached 
68. Forester, 767 F.3d at 642 (discussing Duquesne Light Co., 681 F.2d at 805, aff ’g 4 Black Lung Rep. (Juris) 




72. K.C. v. Navistar, BRB No. 07-0136 BLA, 2007 WL 7629805, at *1–7 (Ben. Rev. Bd. Oct. 30, 2007).
73. See id. at *4.
74. Id.
75. No. 88-1162, 1990 WL 101412, at *1 (4th Cir. July 10, 1990). McGraw had been most recently employed 
as a federal mine inspector at the time he filed for benefits, but had previously been an underground coal 
miner. Id.
76. Id. The court did, however, rule that McGraw was still entitled to benefits under the BLBA due to his 
previous work as a miner, before his employment as a federal mine inspector. Id.
77. Id.
78. Kopp v. Office of Workers’ Comp. Programs, 877 F.2d 307, 308 (4th Cir. 1989).
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the Fourth Circuit on appeal.79 The Fourth Circuit held that it did not have 
jurisdiction over the case and therefore refused to rule on the merits as to whether or 
not Kopp could be considered a “miner” in his role as a federal mine inspector.80
 The Sixth Circuit in Forester gave deference to the Fourth Circuit cases because 
the Director of the OWCP followed the Fourth Circuit’s interpretation of “miner.”81 
According to the court, deference to these arguments was appropriate based on the 
analysis developed in Skidmore v. Swift & Co.,82 which includes factors such as: “the 
thoroughness evident in [the agency’s] consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its 
consistency with earlier and later pronouncements, and all those factors which give it 
power to persuade, if lacking power to control.”83 The court erred in giving deference 
to the Fourth Circuit because in McGraw, the court based its decision not to include 
federal mine inspectors in the court’s definition of “miner” on Kopp.84 However, the 
court in Kopp never reached the substantive issue of whether or not a federal mine 
inspector qualified as a “miner” as it stopped its analysis upon determining that it did 
not have jurisdiction to hear the case.85 Furthermore, the case from which Kopp drew 
their definition, Eastern Associated Coal Corp. v. Office of Workers’ Compensation 
Program, never established that a federal mine inspector was not a “miner.”86 In fact, 
the Eastern court did the exact opposite and specifically declined to rule on whether 
or not a federal mine inspector qualified as a “miner.”87 Therefore, the court in 
McGraw erred in using the Kopp opinion as authority. In terms of deference shown to 
the opinions of the Fourth Circuit and the arguments of the Director, Forester places 
the opinions of both the Third and Fourth Circuits on equal footing—both were 




81. Navistar, Inc. v. Forester, 767 F.3d 638, 642, 645 (6th Cir. 2014).
82. Id. at 645 (discussing Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944)). The Skidmore case involved fire and 
alarm first responders employed by Swift & Co. who sued the company for overtime pay they felt they 
were owed, arguing that time spent waiting for alarms to go off should be considered working hours, in 
addition to the time spent responding to the alarms. Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 135–36. The case was 
reversed and remanded but has come to stand for the proposition that an Administrator’s opinion, while 
not controlling of decisions, can be used by courts for guidance. Id. at 140.
83. Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 140.
84. McGraw v. Office of Workers’ Comp. Program, No. 88-1162, 1990 WL 101412, at *1 (4th Cir. July 10, 
1990).
85. Kopp, 877 F.2d at 309.
86. 791 F.2d 1129, 1131 n.2 (4th Cir. 1986).
87. Id.
88. Navistar, Inc. v. Forester, 767 F.3d 638, 642–43 (6th Cir. 2014).
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 The Third Circuit has established that federal mine inspectors are “miners” as 
defined by the BLBA.89 The court in Forester chose to give deference to the Director 
of the OWCP and the Fourth Circuit based on the belief that the cases were stronger 
and that the Director’s opinion deserved more deference than that of the BRB.90 
However, the BRB was created for the exact purpose of hearing these cases and 
deciding whether or not a worker is entitled to benefits.91 Kopp is the only case used 
by the Sixth Circuit that was not simply an affirmation of an agency decision. As 
discussed above, Kopp should not have been used as authority here, as both Kopp and 
the case it cites as precedent, Eastern, did not touch on the substantive issue of 
whether or not a federal mine inspector qualifies as a “miner.” Therefore, when Kopp 
is not considered, the authority of both the Third and Fourth Circuits are affirmed 
agency decisions, and should be given the same weight. Additionally, the BRB 
decision in K.C. v. Navistar indicates a willingness to use the situs-function test to 
include federal mine inspectors in the definition of “miner.”92 The Sixth Circuit 
should have considered decisions by the BRB within its own jurisdiction, especially 
those based on the Sixth Circuit’s own decisions. The court erred in basing its 
reasoning on Fourth Circuit precedent, rather than Third Circuit precedent and 
BRB cases from its own jurisdiction.
 Furthermore, contrary to the Sixth Circuit’s findings, Congress intended that 
federal mine inspectors be included in the definition of “miner.” As the Sixth Circuit 
noted in Forester, Congress never expressly stated that federal inspectors should not 
be considered “miners” as defined by the BLBA.93 In fact, prior cases have considered 
federal mine inspectors to be eligible for the presumption and Congress has never 
provided otherwise.94 Additionally, Congress’s top priority was the safety of miners,95 
which should include those who are employed specifically to ensure that the rest of 
the miners have safe working conditions.
 It is unlikely, therefore, that Congress intended for a worker’s eligibility for 
BLBA benefits to be based on the source of their paychecks rather than the duties 
they perform. Navistar argued that Forester was not meant to be included in the 
BLBA’s definition of “miner” because he was already eligible for FECA benefits.96 
89. Id. at 642 (discussing Duquesne Light Co. v. Moore, 681 F.2d 805 (3rd Cir. 1982), aff ’g 4 Black Lung 
Rep. (Juris) 1-40.2 (Ben. Rev. Bd. 1981)).
90. Id. at 644–47.
91. See BRB Mission Statement, U.S. Dep’t Lab., http://www.dol.gov/brb/mission.htm (last visited Apr. 14, 
2016).
92. K.C. v. Navistar, BRB No. 07-0136 BLA, 2007 WL 7629805, at *4 (Ben. Rev. Bd. Oct. 30, 2007).
93. Forester, 767 F.3d at 644.
94. See, e.g., Forester, 767 F.3d at 642 (discussing Duquesne Light Co., 681 F.2d 805, aff ’g 4 Black Lung Rep. 
(Juris) 1-40.2); K.C., 2007 WL 7629805, at *1–7; see also 30 U.S.C. § 801 (2012) (having no amendments 
in light of decisions).
95. 30 U.S.C. § 801(a).
96. Forester v. Navistar Int’l Truck & Engine Corp., BRB No. 12-0442 BLA, 2013 WL 3479965, at *2 
(Ben. Rev. Bd. June 27, 2013).
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However, Congress has not prohibited federal mine inspectors from receiving both 
FECA benefits and BLBA benefits.97 This ability to receive double benefits indicates 
that Congress intended for federal mine inspectors to be considered “miners” under 
the BLBA.
 Finally, the Sixth Circuit erred in its decision to narrow its holding in Sammons 
v. EAS Coal Co. and create an arbitrary division between private mine inspectors and 
federal mine inspectors. In Sammons, a Sixth Circuit opinion, the court ruled that a 
private mine inspector employed by EAS Coal was a “miner” as defined by the 
BLBA.98 Sammons’s work was deemed “vital and essential . . . as it keeps the mine 
operational, safe, and in repair.”99 Based on this reasoning as applied to the situs-
function test, the Sixth Circuit held that Sammons was a “miner” and was therefore 
entitled to benefits under the BLBA.100
 In Forester, the Sixth Circuit improperly narrowed the Sammons decision to 
include only private mine inspectors. The court ruled that for the years Forester was 
a private mine inspector, he would be considered a “miner” under the BLBA and 
would qualify for the fifteen-year presumption but that his employment as a federal 
mine inspector could not be included.101 However, the court failed to recognize any 
meaningful difference between Forester’s position as a private mine inspector and his 
position as a federal mine inspector.102 The court’s suggestion that a private inspector 
is a “miner” but a federal mine inspector performing the same duty is not a “miner” 
by the BLBA’s standards does not make sense.103
 Forester spent a total of twenty-one years working underground in coal mines. 
While working as a federal mine inspector, he was tasked with ensuring the safety of 
others working in the mines. Inspecting mines to ensure they are safe can certainly 
be considered an integral and necessary part of mine operation, as it is likely that few 
people would be willing to work in a mine that has been deemed unsafe.104 It 
therefore seems unjust to refuse to consider Forester a “miner” by the BLBA’s 
definition for the years he served as a federal mine inspector. From a policy 
standpoint, those who spend fifteen years working in an underground coal mine and 
develop pneumoconiosis should be allowed to use the presumption set out for 
“miners.” Forester’s past work experience should not be barred from inclusion, and he 
97. Howard L. Graham, Federal Employees Compensation Act Practice Guide § 18:35, Westlaw 
(database updated Mar. 2016).
98. Sammons v. EAS Coal Co., No. 92-3030, 1992 WL 348976, at *2 (6th Cir. Nov. 24, 1992).
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Navistar, Inc. v. Forester, 767 F.3d 638, 645–46 (6th Cir. 2014).
102. See id.
103. See generally Alan G. Skutt, Annotation, Who is “Miner” Under Black Lung Benefits Act, 30 U.S.C.A. § 
901 et seq., 97 A.L.R. Fed. 592 § 12 (1990).
104. See 30 C.F.R. § 722.11 (2016).
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should be eligible to receive BLBA benefits based on his ability to meet the factors of 
the rebuttable presumption.
 Additionally, federal mine inspectors must ensure that federal regulations are 
followed.105 If more inspectors choose to work directly for private companies in order 
to establish the fifteen-year employee presumption, then mine safety will potentially 
decline. This decline would occur because fewer people would be interested in federal 
inspection jobs. Private inspectors would potentially be more loyal to their companies 
than to the federal government. This conflict could lead to inspectors keeping quiet 
if not all regulations are strictly followed in order to protect their mining companies 
and their employment. Also, fewer federal inspectors means less time to inspect 
mines and report conduct not in line with regulations, as inspectors will not be able 
to visit each mine as frequently.
 The Forester court incorrectly showed more deference to the opinions of the 
Fourth Circuit than to the opinions of the Third Circuit. The court additionally 
misinterpreted Congress’s intent and overly narrowed the standard it set out in 
Sammons. The court’s decision could have the unintended result of stopping others 
from choosing to become federal mine inspectors, in turn endangering the safety of 
all miners. For these legal and policy reasons, Forester’s employment as a federal 
mine inspector should be deemed time spent employed as a “miner” by the BLBA’s 
definition and qualify him for the fifteen-year presumption and BLBA benefits.
105. See id.
